Afrobarometer, the most comprehensive African public opinion research initiative into governance, recently released a flagship report that points to a substantial decrease in the quality of democracy across the continent over the past decade. Amongst them, South Africa emerged as one of the worst performers, with approval ratings for democracy in this period dropping by 35 percentage points from 60% to 25%.

Findings like these do provide a broader context to the challenge that the recently-formed Government of National Unity (GNU) will have to respond to in coming months and years. Not only will it have to rebuild and service economic infrastructure that was neglected in the years of state capture to give the economy a fighting chance, it’s success will also be measured against the extent to which it succeeds in resurrecting the country’s ailing democratic infrastructure that fell victim to the exploits of those that leveraged key public institutions at the expense of South Africans. After all, the former was enabled by the complete systemic failure of the latter.

This is not a matter of conjecture. In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that Parliament, the country’s apex legislative institution, patently failed in its oversight of the executive in the matter pertaining to the use of state funds for the renovation of former president Jacob Zuma’s private homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. What was to follow, proved that this incident was only the top of the iceberg. The six volumes of the Zondo Commission into State Capture, which were published in the course of 2022, laid bare that Nkandla was not an outlier, but an exemplar of a broader culture of looting enabled by passive and, in some instances, complicit democratic institutions.

The Afrobarometer findings between 2011 and 2022 show that not even the “New Dawn”, associated with the ascendance of current President Cyril Ramaphosa, managed to stem the negative tide of opinion towards democracy in South Africa. In fact, between 2018, when he assumed office, and 2022, approval for the functioning of democracy in South Africa fell by 17%. While it has to be acknowledged in all fairness that Ramaphosa’s task was complicated by the scale of  the Zuma administration’s disastrous aftermath, the perceived lack of urgency in dealing with these, as well as perpetrators responsible for the pillaging of the state, did not do his government favours.

Viewed against this backdrop, the result of the 2024 general elections marked the end of an era, where the only uncertainty in the crafting of policy and legislation related to positions taken by factions within the ruling party. It also provides an opportunity to reset. The absence of a completely dominant governing party opens the door for greater oversight and accountability and less sanctioned impunity for those in the legislative and executive arms of the state that do not put the interest of South Africans first. It also places a greater burden on opposition parties that will now become more influential in shaping the South African policy agenda.

Democracy has not failed us over the past decade; our leaders, as custodians of the system, have. In light of this, the framework of the GNU creates the potential for shaping a new political culture that puts the interests of South Africans first. The balance of power has ever so slightly shifted from away party leaders to ordinary people. This is good for democracy. This is good for South Africa. In these early days, where the impulse to revert to old habits that exploit the country’s historical divides to polarize rather than unite may be strong, it would be critical for all parties to remain aware of the greater national imperative to restore democratic culture in the way of a lost decade and a half.

In light of the above, the proposed national dialogue should, in theory, be welcomed. For such an initiative to work in practice, however, it would be critical that it is citizen-led and not dominated by government agenda-setting and voices. It requires legislators that listen; that strive to serve. The crisis of democracy in Africa, and also in South Africa, is one where agency belongs to those in power and is legitimated by the theatrics of representation. The Afrobarometer findings show that citizens are not fooled by this. South Africa now has the opportunity to change course. Will it rise to the occasion?

Zusipe Batyi is a Senior Communications Officer at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.